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ABSTRACT 
 
Many critics of increasing freedom of trade and of movement, and the phenomena of 
cosmopolitanism and globalization that result from such freedom, insist that the consequence of 
greater trade and movement is a net loss of identity.  Globalization is, they allege, destructive of 
personal identity itself, which they see as reliant on sharply delineated differences among cultures.  
This paper sets out the anti-globalist critique and then shows that cosmopolitanism and 
globalization are hardly new phenomena, but have deep roots in European civilization.  The threat 
allegedly posed by globalization to personal identity is described and the arguments of its main 
proponents given, followed by a critique of the theory of personal identity implicit in the argument 
and an alternative theory of personal identity (a “focal theory”) is described; that theory is both truer 
to lived human experience and fully compatible with the securing of personal identity in the context 
of an increasingly globalized world of free individuals. 
 
 
Many critics of increasing freedom of trade and of movement, and of the resulting 
phenomenon of “globalization”, insist that we are witnessing a net loss of identity, of 
difference and variation, and that that loss represents a net loss of value to humanity.  
Globalization has been identified with the emergence of a cosmopolis, or universal 
civilization, that destroys all local differences and robs peoples and persons of their 
distinctive identities.  Even the ability of artists from otherwise obscure artistic 
traditions to expose their work to the wider world and enrich themselves in the process 
is portrayed as merely another form of loss of identity and submission to exploitation. 
(1) Much of that “cultural” critique of globalization has been effectively answered by 
Tyler Cowen in his book Creative Destruction: How Globalization is Changing the 
World’s Cultures.  (2) In this short essay, I address a related topic that has been 
exploited by a wide variety of political philosophers and theorists to advance an anti-
cosmopolitan, anti-liberal, and anti-globalization agenda: the alleged destruction of 
personal identity by globalization and cosmopolitanism.  I believe that the charge is 
false and rests on a deeply flawed theory of personal identity.  I outline an alternative 
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understanding of personal identity that is, I believe, both more consistent with the lived 
experiences of many millions of people and fully compatible with globalization and 
cosmopolitanism. 
 
 
1. The Critique of Cosmopolitanism 
 
In recent years cosmopolitanism has been subject to a remarkable amount of 
uncharitable criticism.  For example, in his extended meditation on the relationship 
between nationality and obligations of distributive justice, David Miller considers the 
cosmopolitan alternative only en passant and even then with evident disdain. 
Adherents to a cosmopolitan worldview are described as “those who view the world as 
a kind of giant supermarket, where place of residence is to be decided by the 
particular basket of goods (jobs, amenities, climate, etc.) available there.” (3) 
Unnamed cosmopolitans are portrayed as believing that “they should regard their 
nationality merely as a historic accident, an identity to be sloughed off in favor of 
humanity at large.” (4)  
Another quite hostile commentator on cosmopolitanism indicates why collectivists find 
cosmopolitanism so uncongenial.  Max Hildebert Boehm asserts: 
 
Any influence, external or internal, which operates independently of the individual’s 
choice to dissolve the organic bonds between him and his native group and to 
undermine his feeling of solidarity may create the a priori conditions for 
cosmopolitanism, inasmuch as cosmopolitanism itself provides an escape from specific 
social authority.  That is, by standing, or aiming to stand, in immediate communion 
with all men, an individual easily avoids the risks and sacrifices which in view of the 
perpetual conflicts between all particularistic groups beset a social life based on 
narrower solidarities.  The profession of cosmopolitanism may, it is true, bring with it 
new decisions and trials, for instance in time of war or in a conservative environment.  
But on the whole the actual obligations which cosmopolitanism lays upon its adherents 
are comparatively negligible -- the more so because in practice it seldom goes beyond 
demonstration, sentimentality, propaganda, and sectarian fanaticism.  Hence it often 
exists among persons whom fortune has relieved from the immediate struggle for 
existence and from pressing social responsibility and who can afford to indulge their 
fads and enthusiasms. (5) 
 
Thus, cosmopolitanism is typically represented as a kind of adolescent and self-
indulgent evasion of responsibilities, something to be expected of shallow and 
pampered elites, but not of mature people of sound judgment. 
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But those representations are false.  Cosmopolitanism is a tradition of great depth and 
capable of sustained philosophical defense.  It is also a viewpoint with much wider 
appeal than merely intellectual or financial elites, as witness the many millions upon 
millions of people who have left hearth and home in search of “jobs, amenities, 
climate, etc.,” not to mention religious toleration, the rule of law, the freedom to 
choose one’s spouse, the right to start a business enterprise and offer products to 
willing buyers, and the right to enjoy the fruits of one’s labors. 
Nor is cosmopolitanism a new philosophical viewpoint.  Although I cannot provide here 
a comprehensive history of the cosmopolitan ideal, a brief overview is in order, if only 
to demonstrate that cosmopolitanism is neither a passing fad among pampered elites 
nor of recent provenance. 
 
 
2. Cosmopolitanism and Civilization 
 
Cosmopolitanism is nearly as old as recorded history itself and may be the first 
coherently articulated political philosophy of the western world (at least).  About the 
year 420 BCE the philosopher Democritus of Abdera wrote, “To a wise man, the 
whole earth is open; for the native land of a good soul is the whole earth.” (6) 
It is likely no accident that Democritus and others with similar views were writing 
during the flourishing of one of the most open, commercial, and scientific civilizations 
the world had yet seen. (7) The idea of a cosmo-polis, or a universal polity, may come 
naturally to observers of societies characterized by extensive commercial, scientific, 
and artistic intercourse among peoples of various nations, religions, and political 
systems, as the Greek world of the Fifth Century BCE most certainly was.  Commercial 
contact with many different civilizations, cultures, and languages inclined many 
thinkers (but by no means all) to observe certain regularities in the activities of the 
many foreigners (“barbarians”: people who could not speak Greek properly, and 
whose speech sounded like “bar bar bar bar”) with whom they traded.  Indeed, those 
who refused or failed to engage in trade were portrayed as savages.  The identification 
of trade with civilization goes back even further, to the early roots of Greek culture.  In 
Book IX of the Odyssey Homer depicts the Cyclopean race as savages precisely 
because they do not trade or have contact with others:  
 
For the Cyclops have no ships with crimson prows, 
no shipwrights there to build them good trim craft 
that could sail them out to foreign ports of call 
 as most men risk the seas to trade with other men. (8) 
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The observation of regularities is the foundation of the idea of law, whether in the 
physical world or the social world. Such observed regularities provide the kernel for 
the universalism that characterizes cosmopolitanism.  There is one law, the law of 
nature (physis), that regulates the affairs of humans and that provides the sameness 
(“the one”) to which “social convention” (nomos) provides the difference (“the many”), 
for difference can only be displayed against a background of sameness, and sameness 
can only be appreciated against a background of difference, as the Greek dialecticians 
observed. (9) 
Human life manifests regularities that transcend the many differences manifested 
among the peoples of the world.  That transcendent system of regularity, of cause and 
effect, is the foundation for a law of nature that imposes obligations on all, whether 
they acknowledge those obligations or not.  The universality of natural law was a 
common feature of Greek culture.  Antigone in Sophocles’s play defies the law of the 
city and justifies her action (burying her brother’s corpse) by invoking a higher law:  
 
Creon:  And so you dared to disobey the law? 
 
Antigone:  It was not Zeus who published this decree, 
  Nor have the powers who rule among the dead 
  Imposed such laws as this upon mankind; 
  Nor could I think that a decree of yours-- 
  A man--could override the laws of Heaven 
  Unwritten and unchanging.  Not of today 
  Or yesterday is their authority; 
  They are eternal; no man saw their birth. (10) 
 
Some rules are universal, others not.  The former are always and everywhere 
obligatory on all who share the same nature; the latter are accounted for in their 
multiplicity on the basis of consent and opinion, i.e., on the basis of particular 
instantiations of universal principles.  Aristotle neatly distinguished between the two 
kinds in his Nicomachean Ethics. 
 
 Political justice is of two kinds, one natural, the other conventional.  A rule of justice 
is natural that has the same validity everywhere, and does not depend on our accepting 
it or not.  A rule is conventional that in the first instance may be settled in one way or 
the other indifferently, though having once been settled it is not indifferent: for 
example, that the ransom for a prisoner shall be a mina, that a sacrifice shall consist of 
a goat and not of two sheep. (11)  
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That observation of unity within multiplicity was further systematized by the Stoic 
philosophers, especially during the period of Roman domination of mare nostrum and 
the emergence of an extensive commercial civilization involving many cultures and 
nations and of a systematized law -- the ius gentium -- to govern it.  The jurist Gaius 
opened his Institutes with the observation that  
 
All peoples who are governed by laws and customs use law which is partly theirs alone 
and partly shared by all mankind.  The law which each people makes for itself is 
special to itself.  It is called ‘state law’ [ius ciuile], the law peculiar to that state.  But 
the law which natural reason makes for all mankind is applied the same way 
everywhere.  It is called ‘the law of all peoples’ [ius gentium] because it is common to 
every nation. (12) 
 
Cicero transmitted that ancient cosmopolitanism to the medieval Latin West largely 
through his hugely influential De Officiis, in which he reminded his audience that “The 
great Hercules undertook extreme toils and troubles in order to protect and assist all 
races of men” and concluded that “a man who is obedient to nature cannot harm 
another man.” (13)  
The Hebraic and Christian traditions strengthened such legal and philosophical 
considerations with theological ones.  The Hebraic belief that God is transcendent to 
his own creation, and therefore could not be identified with any part of the world, was 
expressed quite powerfully in Exodus 32, which describes God’s anger at the worship 
by the Israelites of the Golden Calf, a mere part of his creation.  The lesson was clear: 
no part of creation can be God, and, of course, that entailed that no mere human 
could be God.  There is a higher law by which all are judged, a lesson taught again by 
Jesus of Nazareth when he confounded the Pharisees and Herodians and enjoined all 
to “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are 
God’s.”  (Matthew 22:21)  Christian theologians transmuted that message into the 
fundamental equality of all humans through references to such passages of the New 
Testament as Matthew 5:43:  
 
You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’  
But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you 
may be sons of your Father who is in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and 
on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust.  For if you love those who 
love you, what reward have you?  Do not even the tax collectors do the same? 
 
Innocent IV, one of the great “Lawyer Popes,” concluded from that and other sources 
that “lordship, possession and jurisdiction can belong to infidels licitly and without sin, 
for these things were not made only for the faithful but for every rational creature as 
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has been said.  For he makes his sun to rise on the just and the wicked and he feeds 
the birds of the air, Matthew c.5, c.6.  Accordingly we say that it is not licit for the 
pope or the faithful to take away from infidels their belongings or their lordships or 
jurisdictions because they possess them without sin.” (14) Even infidels are rational 
creatures who are entitled to their rights.   
Nor is cosmopolitanism limited to the worldviews of antiquity or the high middle ages.   
It constitutes a vitally important part of modern culture, as well.  Joseph Addison’s 
description of his visit to the Royal Exchange of London in 1711 neatly illustrates the 
modern cosmopolitan viewpoint: “Sometimes I am jostled among a Body of 
Armenians: Sometimes I am lost in a Crowd of Jews; and sometimes in a Groupe of 
Dutch-men.  I am a Dane, Swede, or Frenchman at different times, or rather fancy 
myself like the old Philosopher, who upon being asked what Country-man he was, 
replied, That he was a Citizen of the World.” (15) Years later the editor of the 
Encyclopédie, Denis Diderot, concluded his definition of “COSMOPOLITAIN, ou 
COSMOPOLITE” with the pregnant phrase, “Voyez PHILOSOPHE.” (16) For Diderot 
and other figures of the Enlightenment, there was a close connection between 
knowledge, enlightenment, and cosmopolitanism.     
Universalist cosmopolitanism is deeply engrained in the culture of the West and has 
become in recent years a staple of “world culture,” itself a cosmopolitan ideal made 
real.  The global migration of persons, of ideas, and of capital has tied together the 
peoples of the world in a cosmopolis. (17) My purpose is not to chronicle or measure 
the extent of this cosmopolitanization of the world; I do not intend merely to applaud 
what others are busy decrying. (18) Rather, I wish to consider the implications of 
globalization and cosmopolitanism for personal identity.  First, however, a brief detour 
through the theory of distributive justice is in order. 
 
 
3. Exit Rights as the Core of a Cosmopolitan Theory of Justice 
 
Let’s take up the suggestion of Max Hildebert Boehm that “cosmopolitanism itself 
provides an escape from specific social authority,” and focus our attention on the 
implications for distributive justice of a robust right of exit.  As Viktor J. Vanberg and 
Roger D. Congleton note, “many of the social interaction problems (to which the notion 
of morality is commonly applied) arise in contexts where the persons involved actually 
have viable exit options in the sense that they can refuse to interact with their 
respective counterparts.” (19) The core of a cosmopolitan theory of justice I take to be 
the right of exit.  Actual exercise of the right of exit will entail different costs for 
different persons in different settings and at different times.  For some the act of 
leaving an accustomed environment is unbearable, for others it is not.  But the variable 
costs of exercising the right of exit have no effect on the moral justification of the right, 
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pace the implications of David Miller’s treatment of the issue.  We lack, as Hillel 
Steiner concluded in his treatment of the transnational migration of people, “any non-
contractual power to prevent her or him from removing themselves [sic] and all their 
property from our jurisdiction.” (20)   
Consideration of exit rights and of obligations not to harm strangers has played a 
prominent role in political theory in the past.  Philosophical cosmopolitanism has long 
been associated with Immanuel Kant, who included an explicitly cosmopolitan element 
in his proposal for a “Perpetual Peace,” viz. a “Cosmopolitan Right [which] shall be 
limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality.” (21) For Kant there is no guaranteed 
right of entry into a territory, but there should be a guarantee of “the right of a 
stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory.” 
(22) This right of hospitality arises because “The peoples of the earth have thus 
entered into varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the 
point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.  The idea 
of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary 
complement to the unwritten code of political and universal right, transforming it into a 
universal right of humanity.”  That right to be received without hostility (if one is 
received) is complementary to the more fundamental right of exit.  In the Metaphysics 
of Morals Kant argued that 
 
The subject (considered also as a citizen) has the right of emigration, for the state 
could not hold him back as it might a piece of property. (23) 
 
Thomas Jefferson, in his A Summary View of the Rights of British America, reminded 
the British crown that 
 
our ancestors, before their emigration to America, were the free inhabitants of the 
British dominions in Europe, and possessed a right, which nature has given to all men, 
of departing from the country in which chance, not choice has placed them, of going in 
quest of new habitations, and of there establishing new societies, under such laws and 
regulations as to them shall seem most likely to promote public happiness. (24)  
 
If the right of emigration, or of exit generally, is the core of the cosmopolitan position, 
it is fair to ask whether such a right is compatible with plausible theories of 
personhood, or of personal identity.  Would one suffer a loss of identity, or a loss of 
self, if one were to choose to exercise such a right?  Globalization and cosmopolitanism 
would certainly lose much of their moral appeal if there were no plausible account of 
personal identity that would be compatible with the exercise of the right of exit from a 
social or political order. 
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4. Cosmopolitanism and Personal Identity 
 
Critics of cosmopolitanism sometimes use the term to refer to a kind of superior 
attitude, one that characterizes those who have traveled and look down upon their 
neighbors who have not.  Thus, Thomas Hood wrote, “I don’t set up for being a 
cosmopolite, which to my mind signifies being polite to every country except your 
own.” (25) David Miller and Max Boehm may have such a cosmopolite in their sights 
when they extol national patriotism over cosmopolitanism. But there is no necessary 
connection between such attitudes and cosmopolitanism.  Neither the cosmopolitan 
identity (to be described below) nor the cosmopolitan standard of right (discussed 
above) entails a lack of respect for any particular country, social group, nation, 
ethnicity, or other affective social relation, including “your own.” A cosmopolitan 
would, however, deny that affective social relations are constitutive of identity in the 
way that certain communitarians have used the term constitutive, i.e., to refer to 
inextricable and completely inescapable linkages. (26) Michael Sandel argues, for 
example, that individualism generally (and by implication individualist 
cosmopolitanism) fails to deal adequately with the problem of personal identity, for “to 
be capable of a more thoroughgoing reflection, we cannot be wholly unencumbered 
subjects of possession, individuated in advance and given prior to our ends, but must 
be subjects constituted in part by our central aspirations and attachments, always 
open, indeed vulnerable, to growth and transformation in the light of revised self-
understandings.  And in so far as our constitutive self-understandings comprehend a 
wider subject than the individual alone, whether a family or tribe or city or class or 
nation or people, to this extent they define a community in a constitutive sense.” (27) 
Thus, each of us has certain “constitutive self-understandings” without which we would 
simply have no fixed identity, and those self-understandings are so connected with the 
“family or tribe or city or class or nation or people” that what is really identified is not 
a numerically and materially individuated human person, but a collective person.   
What Sandel is arguing is that an epistemological principle can be transformed into an 
ontological principle: “this notion of community [the constitutive conception] describes 
a framework of self-understandings that is distinguishable from and in some sense 
prior to the sentiments and dispositions of individuals within the framework.” (28) 
Because shared understandings are necessary for our self-understanding, i.e., because 
they are asserted to be an epistemic criterion for self knowledge, it is asserted that 
those shared understandings are constitutive of our identity, and that therefore “the 
bounds of the self are no longer fixed, individuated in advance and given prior to 
experience.” (29) 
That move is unjustified.  As John Haldane remarks, “even if this were granted it 
would not follow from it that subjects of these relationships are anything other than 
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distinct persons.  To suppose otherwise is to infer fallaciously that epistemological 
considerations enter into the constitution of the object known.”(30) That individuals 
share notions of justice, compassion, and self-understanding does not imply that the 
boundaries of those individuals melt into a vast fondue of communal understandings, 
for, as Haldane points out, “Features can only be shared if they attach to bearers 
which at base are numerically diverse.” (31)  
Sandel makes a serious error in arguing against numerically individuated agents: the 
epistemological conditions of a certain kind of knowledge are unjustifiably transmuted 
into ontological foundations of a certain kind of being, with serious results for political 
theory.  That move was anticipated by Thomas Aquinas, who argued that “It is . . . 
one thing which is understood both by me and by you.  But it is understood by me in 
one way and by you in another, that is, by another intelligible species.  And my 
understanding is one thing, and yours, another; and my intellect is one thing, and 
yours another.” (32) Thomas recognized the importance of such epistemological and 
ontological confusion for morality and politics; he noted that “If . . . the intellect does 
not belong to this man in such a way that it is truly one with him, but is united to him 
only through phantasms or as a mover, the will will not be in this man, but in the 
separate intellect.  And so this man will not be the master of his act, nor will any act of 
his be praiseworthy or blameworthy.  That is to destroy the principles of moral 
philosophy.  Since this is absurd and contrary to human life (for it would not be 
necessary to take counsel or to make laws), it follows that the intellect is united to us in 
such a way that it and we constitute what is truly one being.” (33) 
Further, the collectivist/communitarian approach implies that cultures are hermetically 
sealed one from another, that if you and I are in the “same culture,” we must have the 
same “self-understandings,” such that together we form a “self,” differentiated from 
other selves by “bounds that . . .  are not given by the physical, bodily differences 
between individual human beings, but by the capacity of the self through reflection to 
participate in the constitution of its identity, and where circumstances permit, to arrive 
at an expansive self-understanding.” (34) (I do not claim to understand precisely what 
Sandel is getting at here, and I have my doubts whether even he does, but it does 
seem clear that a mystical collective self -- “whose bounds are not given by the 
physical, bodily differences between individual human beings” -- is being discussed.) 
Sandel is surely wrong to assert that people who participate in the “same” culture have 
the same self, or even the same self-understandings.  There is not one culture anyplace 
on the globe that could provide “constitutive self-understandings” capable of 
constituting collective selves of the sort Sandel attempts to describe, for each culture 
melts imperceptibly into the others.  There is no longer any culture that could be 
identified as “pure,” i.e., that is not a mélange of bits and pieces contributed by or 
drawn from other cultures.  Jeremy Waldron subjects a strong claim of the 
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communitarian theorist Alisdair Macintyre to withering criticism: Macintyre wrote 
lyrically in After Virtue that 
 
It is through hearing stories about wicked stepmothers, lost children, good but 
misguided kings, wolves that suckle twin boys, youngest sons who receive no 
inheritance but must make their way in the world and eldest sons who waste their 
inheritance on riotous living and go into exile to live with the swine, that children learn 
or mislearn both what a child and what is a parent is, what the cast of characters may 
be in the drama into which they have been born and what the ways of the world are. 
(35)  
 
Waldron observes “these are heterogeneous characters drawn from a variety of 
disparate cultural sources: from first-century Palestine, from the heritage of Germanic 
folklore, and from the mythology of the Roman Republic.  They do not come from 
some thing called ‘the structure of our culture.’” (36) 
As Waldron asks, “What if there has been nothing but mélange all the way down?  
What if cultures have always been implicated with one another, through trade, war, 
curiosity, and other forms of inter-communal relation?  What if the mingling of cultures 
is as immemorial as cultural roots themselves?  What if purity and homogeneity have 
always been myths?” (37) And just as the identity of each necessarily cosmopolitan 
culture may be a shifting focus within overlapping influences, so the identity of the 
person may be a shifting focus within overlapping influences.(38) 
That is not to say that there are no ethnic or national characteristics, no commonalities 
among persons that distinguish them from others.  There clearly are.  But pointing that 
out is no refutation of cosmopolitanism or of a theory of identity consistent with 
cosmopolitanism.  Indeed, it would be impossible to recognize the common nature of 
humanity in the absence of any identifiable differences; the “same” cannot be 
recognized without the “other,” the “one” without the “many.”  Recognizing that we 
adopt beliefs and self-understandings that we believe to be true, useful, interesting, 
moral, amusing, and so on from other persons, other cultures, and other languages is 
not shameful; it is just a recognition of reality. 
The communitarian approach implicitly denies that one’s identity might be constituted 
by universalist, individualist, cosmopolitan self-understandings.  The devout Moslem or 
Christ ian, for example, may very well see her attachment to a universalist religious 
faith as constitutive of her identity in ways that her being American, Albanian, or Arab 
is not.  Such identities are quite common -- and therefore possible -- and collectivist 
and communitarian theorists have offered little reason to believe that they are 
unhappier or poorer than are more localized identities. 
We can distinguish, then, among at least three different broad understandings of 
personal identity: 1) “thick” theories, which are associated with a wide variety of 
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collectivists and communitarians, according to which the individual is constituted by all 
(or perhaps just by most, or by the most important) of the elements of a complex 
culture, with all of those elements considered as necessary and unchangeable 
conditions of identity; 2) “thin” theories, which are associated commonly with 
Immanuel Kant and his followers, according to which individual identity is associated 
with a purely formal characteristic of consciousness as such, such as the 
transcendental unity of apperception; and 3) “focal” theories, such as the “succession” 
theory of Aristotle and the “closest continuer” theory of Nozick, which are both 
“thinner” than the collectivist theories, for individual elements of identity may be 
added or subtracted without obliterating the identity of the person, and “thicker” than 
the formal or abstract theories, for each person is identified, individuated, and 
distinguished from others by reference to contingent characteristics.   
Focal theories recognize that personal identity can be a matter of both circumstance 
and choice.  They capture better the way in which the elements of one’s identity can 
change over time, without merely dissolving into unconnected and disparate parts.  
Unlike thick theories, they do not rule out the widely observed and acknowledged 
movement of persons from culture to culture, without loss of self.  Unlike thin theories, 
they acknowledge that one’s commitments are not simply phenomenal ornaments 
somehow stuck on to a merely noumenal transcendental object (or subject), which is 
posited as a kind of substrate – or pin cushion – that is itself devoid of characteristics.  
Unlike both thick and thin theories, focal theories of personal identity provide a 
plausible part of the metaphysical foundation for an increasingly globalized world of 
free persons.  
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(9) This seems to be the main message - if there is a message - in The Parmenides of 
Plato, esp. the passages around 165c to 166b. 
(10) Antigone, in Sophocles, Antigone, Oedipus the King, Electra, Edith Hal ed., trans. 
by H. D. F. Kitto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 16-7. 
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